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Mediation Confidentiality: For 
California Litigants, Why Should 
Mediation Confidentiality be a 
Function of the Court in Which the 
Litigation is Pending? 
Rebecca Callahan* 
I. OVERVIEW 
In opening a mediation session, it is fairly routine for the mediator to 
promise comprehensive confidentiality to the participants.1  While there are 
a number of statutes, rules, and cases that support confidentiality in 
mediation,2 a certain amount of skepticism and concern exists regarding the 
scope of protection that actually exists.3  The uncertainty about the nature 
 
 
* Rebecca Callahan is an independent mediator and arbitrator in Newport Beach, California.  Ms. 
Callahan received her J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall) and her B.A. 
from the University of Southern California.  In 2007, she received an LL.M. in Dispute Resolution 
from Pepperdine University School of Law, Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution.  Ms. Callahan is 
on the mediation and commercial arbitration panels of the American Arbitration Association and is 
an adjunct professor at Pepperdine University School of Law where she teaches Mediation Theory 
and Practice.  Ms. Callahan frequently speaks and writes on various dispute resolution topics.  Her 
most recent publications include What to Do when Insolvency Becomes an Issue in Mediation, 14 
CONFLICT MGMT. (ABA SEC. LITIG.), Issue 2, Winter/Spring 2010 (Part 1) and 14 CONFLICT 
MGMT. (ABA SEC. LITIG.), Issue 3, Summer/Fall 2010 (Part 2); Truth or Dare: California’s New 
Ethics Standards for Private Arbitrators, 18 BUS. L. NEWS, Issue 1, 2008; and California’s New 
Ethics Standards: A Hot Bed of Controversy and Conflicting Decisions, 5 J. AM. ARB. 295 (2006).  
Ms. Callahan is a past president of The Peter M. Elliott American Inn of Court and is the current 
Chair-elect of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Section of the Orange County Bar Association. 
 1. Indeed, in the context of an attorney–mediator’s ethical obligations, some courts have 
charged attorney–mediators with the obligation to receive and preserve confidences in much the 
same manner as the attorney–client privilege.  See Poly Software Int’l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487 
(D. Utah 1995) (law firm disqualified when one of the firm’s attorneys had served as a mediator in 
the litigated matter); McKenzie Constr. v. St. Croix Storage Corp., 961 F. Supp. 857 (D.V.I. 1997). 
 2. See infra Part III. 
 3. See infra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
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and extent of what confidentiality protections exist for things said in 
mediation is especially apparent in federal court litigation disputes.4  As 
discussed below, the scope of protection available under California law is 
quite broad as compared to that available under federal law which is unclear 
and minimal at best. 
Scholars have recognized that “as a legal matter, there is still 
considerable uncertainty about the extent to which communications made 
during the process of mediating a dispute are protected from disclosure in 
subsequent legal proceedings.”5  One authority has opined that “[c]urrently, 
it is not an overstatement to say that no mediator or counsel in the country 
can, with confidence, predict the extent to which it will be possible to 
maintain the confidentiality of a mediation.”6 
As discussed below, both state and federal courts recognize that a 
theoretical component of mediation is confidentiality.  While California has 
express statutory provisions that provide for confidentiality protections, and 
numerous Supreme Court of California decisions endorse those protections, 
no similar protections are available under federal law.7  Therefore, the 
confidentiality protections afforded California litigants with respect to 
communications had in mediation may depend on whether litigation is 
pending or ultimately filed in state or federal court.  Because mediation is a 
nonjudicial alternative to litigation in the courts, the question posed by this 
article is: Why should mediation confidentiality depend upon (a) whether the 
dispute has escalated to the point of litigation, and (b) whether that litigation 
is pending in state or federal court?8 
II. CONFIDENTIALITY AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF MEDIATION 
The inclusion of confidentiality as a defining feature of mediation 
comes from its theoretical underpinnings.  “The salient features of mediation 
 
 4. See infra Part IV; see also DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES 218-220 
(2009); Dennis Sharp, The Many Faces of Mediation Confidentiality, in HANDBOOK ON MEDIATION 
223-236 (2d ed. 2010). 
 5. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation—A Preferred Method of Dispute Resolution, 16 PEPP. 
L. REV. S5, 28 (1989); Note, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 441, 446-
47 (1984); see also Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Pigroff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The 
Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37 (1986). 
 6. Ellen E. Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal System, 17 
OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 239, 241 (2002). 
 7. See infra Part IV. 
 8. See discussion infra Part III (California statutory law makes communications in mediation 
inadmissible as evidence in any legal proceeding); Part IV (no similar counterpart exists under 
federal law).  Therefore, a California litigant bears the risk that statements made or writings prepared 
during mediation of a state court dispute may become admissible as evidence in a subsequent or 
related federal court action. 
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are an informal process, a neutral mediator without authority to command a 
result, disputants who participate voluntarily and settle of their own accord, 
and . . . confidentiality of mediation communications.”9  Some have said that 
confidentiality is vital to mediation because compromised negotiations often 
require parties to reveal deep-seated feelings or sensitive issues or to make 
admissions and concessions which would be “impossible if the parties were 
constantly looking over their shoulders.”10  Problem-solving discussions are 
a key part of negotiations and require the parties to provide reasons and 
explanations for their proposals, assumptions, and expectations, which might 
require the exchange of personal, proprietary, or otherwise confidential 
information in order for these discussions to be successful.11  Because 
mediation is nonbinding and can only result in a settlement if and to the 
extent that the disputants agree to a negotiated resolution, parties have 
legitimate reasons for being concerned that statements made in an effort to 
resolve a dispute might be used against them should a full settlement not be 
achieved.12 
There is general agreement that mediation is a communication process 
in which the goal is a negotiated resolution of a dispute, or at least progress 
towards that end, with the mediator being tasked with the job of facilitating 
constructive dialogue between or among disputants.13  The willingness of the 
 
 9. Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege’s Transition from Theory to Implementation: 
Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the Process, and the 
Public, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 6 (1995); see also JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 205 (2d ed. 2006) (“Confidentiality is generally considered to be an essential 
ingredient in mediation.”); Sharp, supra note 4, at 223 (“Confidentiality is one of the keys to the 
acceptability and success of mediation among parties to a dispute.”). 
 10. Michael L. Prigoff, Toward Candor or Chaos: The Case of Confidentiality in Mediation, 
12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 103 (1988). 
 11. ALFINI, supra note 9, at 133, 205-06. 
 12. Sharp, supra note 4, at 225. 
 13. See SUZANNE MCCORKLE & MELANIE J. REESE, MEDIATION THEORY & PRACTICE 33 
(2005). 
 
Mediators listen to the disputants’ stories, allow them to vent their frustrations, validate 
each person’s worth and feelings, and provide appropriate feedback.  Mediators are 
conduits of information.  They allow parties to share information with each other and 
enable parties to understand each other’s perspective.  Mediators keep communication 
focused on important and relevant issues.  They help disputants discover and express 
their own interests and goals.  Mediators are links to additional expertise, data, or 
resources that may be required to settle a dispute.  They know the services available in 
their community and assist the parties to determine if outside, objective data are required.  
Mediators are boundary keepers when they frame issues, moderate emotions, and contain 
the conflict within a productive range. 
3
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parties to “open up” is critical to the mediator’s ability to engage parties in 
the problem-solving and negotiation aspects of mediation.14  As one 
authority put it, “Mediation is a communication process; solving legal 
problems is simply a byproduct.”15 
III. CALIFORNIA’S STRICT CONFIDENTIALITY SCHEME 
California favors settlement of civil disputes, as evidenced by the 
enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 1775, which states that “[t]he 
peaceful resolution of disputes in a fair, timely, appropriate, and cost-
effective manner is an essential function of the judicial branch of state 
government . . . .”16  To effectuate this policy, the state legislature has 
expressly validated mediation as a process that “provides parties with a 
simplified and economical procedure for obtaining prompt and equitable 
resolution of their disputes and a great opportunity to participate directly in 
resolving these disputes.”17  Because mediation provides a simple, quick, 
and economical means of resolving disputes, and because it may also help 
reduce the court system’s backlog of cases, California has recognized that 
the public has an interest in protecting not only mediation participants, but 
also the mediation process itself.18 
A. What Qualifies as a “Mediation” for Purposes of Confidentiality 
Protection? 
The starting point for California’s mediation confidentiality scheme is 
Evidence Code section 1115, which defines the processes that qualify for 
confidentiality protection.19  This protection extends to “mediations” and 
“mediation consultations.”20  A mediation consultation is defined as “a 
communication between a person and a mediator for the purpose of 
initiating, considering, or reconvening a mediation or retaining the 
mediator.”21  Mediation is defined as “a process in which a neutral person or 
persons facilitate communication between the disputants to assist them in 
 
Id. 
 14. Kirtley, supra note 9, at 6.  
 15. Kent L. Brown, Comment, Confidentiality in Mediation: Status and Implications, 1991 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 307, 309 (1991). 
 16. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1775(a) (West 2011). 
 17. Id. § 1775(c). 
 18. See Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 264-65 (Cal. 2004). 
 19. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1115 (West 2011). 
 20. Id. § 1115(a), (c). 
 21. Id. § 1115(c). 
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reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.”22  The comments to section 
1115 make it clear that what qualifies as a mediation is to be determined by 
“the nature of a proceeding, not its label,” and that a proceeding might 
qualify as a mediation for purposes of the confidentiality protections “even 
though it is denominated differently.”23  The fact that a court may use the 
terms “mediation” and “settlement” interchangeably when referring to the 
process taking place or the fact that a judicial officer might be assigned to 
preside over the talks will not transform the proceeding into a mandatory 
settlement conference without a clear record that such a conference was 
ordered.24  This is an important distinction because Evidence Code section 
1117(b)(2) provides that the confidentiality protections afforded to 
communications in mediation do not apply to communications during a 
mandatory settlement conference convened pursuant to rule 3.1380 of the 
California Rules of Court.25 
The Archdiocese Case is an example of how broadly courts have 
construed what qualifies as a mediation for purposes of affording 
confidentiality protection to facilitated settlement discussions.26  In the 
Archdiocese Case, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Los Angeles had been 
named as the principal defendant in nearly 500 lawsuits based upon 
allegations that various priests had committed acts of childhood sexual 
molestation on the plaintiffs.27  The court appointed a judge to facilitate 
“settlement and mediation” among the parties.28  As part of that process, the 
church prepared “written summaries of its personnel and other files 
concerning more than 100 priests who had been identified as molesters” and 
submitted them to the settlement judge for use in his settlement and 
mediation efforts.29  The church stated that it planned to release the 
summaries publicly once they were completed.30  In response, some of the 
accused priests filed a motion for protective order to bar public disclosure of 
 
 22. Id. § 1115(a). 
 23. Id. § 1115(a) cmt. (1997). 
 24. See Doe 1 v. Superior Court (Archdiocese Case), 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 248, 252 (Ct. App. 
2005) (“Except where the parties have expressly agreed otherwise, appellate courts should not seize 
on an occasional reference to ‘settlement’ as a means to frustrate the mediation confidentiality 
statutes.”).  
 25. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1117 (West 2010). 
 26. See Archdiocese Case, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 248. 
 27. See id. at 249-50. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 1164.  
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the written summaries.31  In addition to privacy and privilege issues, the 
priests argued that the proposed release violated the mediation 
confidentiality protections afforded by the Evidence Code.32  The trial court 
denied the motion and the accused priests filed a petition for writ of mandate 
to reverse the trial court’s order and stop any public disclosure of the 
summaries.33  The court of appeal granted the petition, holding that 
disclosure of the summaries was barred by the mediation confidentiality 
privilege.34 
B. What is Protected? 
Confidentiality protection is provided not in the form of an evidentiary 
privilege, but rather in the form of an evidence exclusion provision.35  As 
evidence in a court proceeding, Evidence Code section 1119 bars disclosure 
of (a) ”anything said or any admission made for the purpose of, in the course 
of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation”;36 (b) any writing 
“prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or 
a mediation consultation”;37 and (c) ”[a]ll communications, negotiations, or 
settlement discussions by and between participants in the course of a 
mediation or a mediation consultation . . . .”38  The Supreme Court of 
California has confirmed on several occasions that  “any” and “all” 
provisions of section 1119 are to be interpreted quite literally and made it 
clear that the scope of protection intended by the statute is unqualified, clear, 
absolute,39 and is not subject to judicially crafted exceptions or limitations.40  
The facts of the cases in which the Supreme Court of California has been 
called upon to rule about the scope of protection afforded by section 1119 
have been somewhat extreme and serve to illustrate the breadth of what will 
be held as confidential if the communications—and sometimes conduct—
occurred during a mediation.41 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1173-74.  
 35. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West 2011). 
 36. Id. § 1119(a) (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. § 1119(b) (emphasis added). 
 38. Id. § 1119(c) (emphasis added). 
 39. See, e.g., Foxgate Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1126 (Cal. 
2001); Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 207 (Cal. 2004); Fair v. Bakhtiari, 147 P.3d 653, 658-
59 (Cal. 2006). 
 40. See, e.g., Simmons v. Ghaderi, 187 P.3d 934, 945-46 (Cal. 2008); Cassel v. Superior 
Court, 244 P.3d 1080, 1087-88 (Cal. 2011).  
 41. See infra Parts III.B.1–4. 
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1. Foxgate Decision (2001) 
In 2001, the Supreme Court of California first addressed this issue in 
Foxgate.42  This case discusses party conduct and statements made during 
mediation with respect to one party’s nonparticipation—rather than the 
exchange of information or offers during the course of a mediation.43  The 
case concerned a construction defect claim for a sixty-five-unit 
condominium complex.44  A special master appointed by the superior court 
to mediate and rule on discovery motions ordered the parties to mediation, 
and the court’s notice instructed that the parties were required to bring their 
experts and claims representatives.45  Five days of mediation were 
reserved.46  On the first day of mediation, plaintiff’s attorney appeared with 
nine experts, while defendants’ attorney arrived late and with zero experts 
because, he believed, due to his knowledge in the field of construction defect 
litigation, he did not need experts to engage in discourse with plaintiff’s 
experts.47  After the morning of the first mediation session, the mediator 
cancelled the subsequent mediation sessions because he concluded they 
could not proceed without defense experts.48  Plaintiff then moved for 
sanctions against defendants and their attorney for failure to participate in 
good faith in a court-ordered mediation and to comply with the order to 
mediate.49  Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions concluded with a 
recommendation that defendants and their counsel should be ordered to 
reimburse the plaintiff for expenses incurred in the mediation.50  Also 
attached to the sanctions motion was a declaration by plaintiff’s counsel 
reciting statements made by defendants’ counsel during the mediation.51  
The mediator also filed a report “recommend[ing] . . . that [defendants and 
 
 42. See Foxgate, 25 P.3d 1117.  
 43. Id. at 1119-20. 
 44. Id. at 1120. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.   
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  The sanctions sought reflected the cost to plaintiff from counsel’s preparation for the 
sessions, the charge of plaintiff’s nine experts for preparation and appearance at the mediation 
session, and the payments to the mediator which was no longer refundable.  Id.  Plaintiff’s 
memorandum of points and authorities and declaration of counsel in support of the motion for 
sanctions recited a series of actions by Bramalea and Stevenson, that plaintiff asserted, reflected a 
pattern of tactics pursued in bad faith and solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.  Id.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  
7
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their attorney] be ordered to reimburse all parties for expenses incurred as a 
result of the cancelled . . . mediation sessions.”52  In granting the sanctions 
motion, the trial court considered the mediator’s report and the declaration 
of plaintiff’s counsel regarding what occurred during the mediation over 
defendants’ objection.53 
The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s sanction order and 
remanded the matter back to the trial court to make specific findings 
regarding the conduct or circumstances justifying the sanctions order.54  The 
court of appeal rejected defendants’ argument that the mediator was barred 
by Evidence Code section 1121 from making a report to the court that 
commented on party conduct during the mediation, reasoning that the 
confidentiality mandated by Evidence Code section 1119 should be balanced 
against the policy recognizing that, unless the parties and their attorneys 
participate in good faith in mediation, there is little to protect.55  The 
Supreme Court of California affirmed the court of appeal’s reversal of the 
sanctions order, but held that if, on remand, the plaintiff elected to pursue a 
sanctions motion, no evidence of communications made during the 
mediation could be admitted or considered.56  In this regard, the supreme 
court specifically rejected the notion that there is any need for judicial 
construction of Evidence Code sections 1119 or 1121, or that a judicially 
crafted exception to mediation confidentiality was necessary.57  The court 
reasoned that “[t]he statutes are clear.  Section 1119 prohibits any person, 
mediator and participants alike, from revealing any written or oral 
communication made during a mediation.”58  The supreme court noted, 
however, that while Evidence Code section 1121 prohibits the mediator from 
advising the court about conduct during a mediation, it does not prohibit a 
party from so advising the court.59 
 
 52. Id. at 1121.  
 53. Id. at 1122. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1125. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1125-26. 
 58. Id. at 1126. 
 59. Id.  The supreme court specifically held that a mediator may not reveal communications 
made during a mediation and that there are no exceptions to the statutory limits on the content of a 
mediator’s report as provided by Evidence Code section 1121.  Id.  
8
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2. Rojas Decision (2004) 
In 2004, the Supreme Court of California next addressed this issue 
Rojas.60  This case involved the confidentiality of information developed and 
prepared for use in mediation.61  Rojas also involves construction defect 
claims in which the owner of the apartment complex complained that the 
water leakage due to the construction defects had produced toxic molds on 
the property requiring its complete demolition.62  The court in Rojas issued a 
case management order which provided that evidence of anything said and 
any document prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to 
any mediation would be privileged pursuant to Evidence Code section 1119 
and not admissible as evidence at trial.63  The litigation between the owner 
and the contractors who built the complex was settled through mediation.64  
Following the settlement, several hundred tenants sued the owner and 
builder for damages resulting from health problems alleged to be the result 
of the mold infestation.65  In discovery, the tenants sought to compel 
production of the materials developed and prepared for use in the earlier 
owner–builder mediation.66  The tenants argued that this discovery should be 
ordered because there was no other evidence of the condition of the building 
before its demolition and repair.67  The trial court denied the motion under 
Evidence Code section 1119 because the materials sought were created in 
connection with the mediation in the earlier case.68  On appeal, the court of 
appeal reversed, finding that “section 1119 does ‘not protect pure evidence,’ 
but protects only ‘the substance of mediation . . . .’”69  The Supreme Court 
of California then reversed and held that: (a) the mediation privilege for 
“writings” covered witness statements, analysis of raw test data, and 
photographs prepared during the mediation; (b) the mediation privilege was 
not subject to a “good cause” exception; and (c) the evidence exclusion 
 
 60. See Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 262 (Cal. 2004).  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 262-63. 
 67. Id. at 263. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  
9
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provisions operated as a bar to discovery of such communications and 
materials.70  The court reasoned: 
In Foxgate, we stated that “[t]o carry out the purpose of encouraging mediation by 
ensuring confidentiality, [our] statutory scheme . . . unqualifiedly bars disclosure of” 
specified communications and writings associated with a mediation “absent an express 
statutory exception.”  We also found that the “judicially crafted exception” to section 
1119 there at issue was “not necessary either to carry out the legislative intent or to avoid 
an absurd result.”  We reach the same conclusion here . . . .71 
3. Simmons Decision (2008) 
In 2008, the Supreme Court of California next addressed this issue in 
Simmons.72  This case involved a “gaming” tactic that one party used against 
the other during negotiations had in a mediation.73  Simmons involves 
wrongful death and medical malpractice claims against a doctor brought by 
the patient’s mother and son.74  The parties went to mediation.75  Before 
beginning settlement negotiations, the defendant doctor executed a standard 
consent-to-settlement agreement which authorized her insurance claims 
specialist to negotiate on her behalf up to a defined settlement value capped 
at $125,000.76  Plaintiffs and their counsel then engaged in settlement 
discussions with the claims specialist and defense attorney hired by the 
insurance company, while the defendant doctor and her personal attorney 
waited in another room.77  At some point during these negotiations, the 
insurance company offered $125,000 and plaintiffs orally accepted the 
offer.78  The settlement terms were then stated in a term sheet document for 
the parties to sign before leaving the mediation.79  At this juncture, the 
defendant doctor revoked the settlement authorization she had given to her 
insurance claims specialist and refused to sign the term sheet 
memorandum.80  Plaintiffs then amended their complaint to add a cause of 
action for breach of contract, alleging that the defendant doctor had breached 
 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 271 (internal citation omitted). 
 72. Simmons v. Ghanderi, 187 P.3d 934, 936 (Cal. 2008).  
 73. Id. at 936. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 937. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
10
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an oral agreement to settle at $125,000.81  At trial, the defendant doctor 
asserted that Evidence Code section 1119 precluded plaintiffs from proving 
the existence of an oral agreement and objected to the admissibility of the 
consent-to-settle agreement, the term sheet memorandum, and other 
evidence offered with respect to the events at the mediation—including a 
declaration by the mediator.82  The trial court overruled defendant’s 
objections and found that plaintiffs and defendant’s agent—the claims 
specialist—had entered into a valid and enforceable oral contract before 
defendant withdrew her consent.83  The trial court ordered specific 
performance and entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs for $125,000.84  The 
defendant doctor appealed.85 
On appeal, the court of appeal affirmed the judgment, finding that a 
valid oral agreement had been reached during the mediation.86  The court of 
appeal found that during pretrial motions, both defendant and plaintiffs had 
presented evidence of the occurrences at the mediation and defendant had 
failed to object to plaintiffs’ proffered evidence with respect to such 
motions.87  Accordingly, the court of appeal found that the defendant doctor 
was estopped from asserting mediation confidentiality at trial to bar 
admission of the mediation evidence.88  The Supreme Court of California 
disagreed and reversed, holding that the court of appeal had improperly 
relied on the doctrine of estoppel to create a judicial exception to the 
statutory requirements of mediation confidentiality as provided by Evidence 
Code section 1119.89  Here, the court reasoned: 
Both the clear language of the mediation statutes and our prior rulings support the 
preclusion of an implied waiver exception.  The legislature chose to promote mediation 
by ensuring confidentiality rather than adopt a scheme to ensure good behavior in the 
mediation and litigation process.  The mediation statutes provide clear and 
comprehensive rules reflecting that policy choice.90 
 
 81. Id. at 938.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 936. 
 90. Id. at 946.  
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4. Cassel Decision (2011) 
The fourth and most recent Supreme Court of California case regarding 
this issue was the 2011 decision in Cassel.91  This case involved private 
attorney–client conversations during the course of a mediation.92  Prior to 
attending the mediation, Michael Cassel met with his attorneys from 
Wasserman, Comden, Casselman & Pearson to discuss mediation strategy 
and, at that time, agreed that Cassel would accept no less than $2 million 
from defendant to settle the lawsuit.93  After several hours of mediation, 
Cassel was told that defendant would pay no more than $1.25 million.94  
Although Cassel felt tired, hungry, and ill, his attorneys insisted that Cassel 
remain until the mediation was concluded and pressed him to accept the 
offer, telling him that he was “greedy” to insist on more.95  At one point, 
Cassel left to have dinner and consult with his family.96  His attorneys called 
and insisted that he return to the mediation, at which time they threatened to 
abandon him at the imminently pending trial, misrepresented certain 
significant terms of the proposed settlement, and falsely assured him they 
could and would negotiate a side deal that would recoup the deficits in the 
settlement.97  They also falsely stated that they would waive or discount a 
large portion of the $188,000 legal bill if he accepted the settlement offer.98  
Finally, at midnight, after fourteen hours of mediation, when he was 
exhausted and unable to think clearly, Cassel’s attorneys presented him with 
a written draft settlement agreement and evaded his questions about its 
complicated terms.99  Believing he had no other choice, Cassel signed the 
agreement.100  After settling the business litigation dispute, Cassel then sued 
his attorneys for malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and breach of 
contract.101  Prior to trial in the malpractice action, Cassel’s attorneys moved 
to exclude all evidence of any discussions they had with plaintiff 
immediately preceding and during the mediation concerning settlement 
strategies and the attorneys’ efforts to persuade plaintiff to reach a settlement 
 
 91. Cassel v. Superior Court, 244 P.3d 1080 (Cal. 2011).  
 92. Id. at 1083-84. 
 93. Id. at 1085.  
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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in the mediation.102  The trial granted the attorneys’ motion excluding the 
evidence of their mediation communications with their client.103 
On appeal, the court of appeal reversed the decision.104  The court of 
appeal reasoned that the mediation confidentiality statutes were intended to 
prevent damaging use against a mediation disputant of tactics employed, 
positions taken, or confidences exchanged in the mediation, and were not 
intended to protect attorneys from malpractice claims by their own clients 
based on advice and other communications made by counsel.105  The court of 
appeal concluded that an attorney sued for malpractice cannot use mediation 
confidentiality as a shield to exclude damaging evidence of private attorney–
client conversations during the mediation.106  On further appeal, the Supreme 
Court of California reversed, finding that the mediation confidentiality 
statutes must be strictly applied and do not permit judicially created 
exceptions or limitations even where competing public policies may be 
affected.107  The court reasoned: 
Here, as in Foxgate, Rojas, Fair, and Simmons, the plain language of the mediation 
confidentiality statutes controls our result. . . . Section 1119, subdivision (a), extends to 
oral communications made for the purpose of or pursuant to a mediation, not just to oral 
communications made in the course of the mediation. 
The obvious purpose of the expanded language is to ensure that the statutory protection 
extends beyond discussions carried out directly between opposing parties to the dispute, 
or with the mediator . . . .  All oral or written communications are covered, if they are 
made “for the purpose of” or “pursuant to” a mediation.  It follows that, absent an express 
statutory exception, all discussions conducted in preparation for a mediation, as well as 
all mediation-related communications that take place during the mediation itself, are 
protected from disclosure.  Plainly, such communications include those between a 
mediation disputant and his or her own counsel, even if these do not occur in the presence 
of the mediator or other disputants.108 
The Cassel decision has been highly criticized from a legal ethics and 
legal malpractice standpoint for giving attorneys a free pass for “settlement 
 
 102. Id. at 1083.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1084. 
 106. Id. at 1085. 
 107. Id. at 1087. 
 108. Id. at 1090-91 (internal citations omitted); c.f. Porter v. Wyner, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653 (Ct. 
App. 2010) (statements made between plaintiff’s attorney and defendant’s attorney purportedly 
causing plaintiff to lower his settlement demand were not protected from discovery in plaintiff’s 
subsequent legal malpractice action because there was no evidence that the statements were made for 
the purpose of or pursuant to a mediation). 
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malpractice” if it occurs in the context of mediation.109  Nevertheless, the 
Cassel decision demonstrates just how broadly the scope of the mediation 
confidentiality statutes will be construed by the Supreme Court of California 
because of the unqualified language of the statute.  As with the earlier cases, 
the supreme court has stated that it is up to the legislature, not the courts, to 
define the contours of mediation confidentiality and acceptable and 
nonacceptable conduct in mediation.110 
C. Special Rules Related to Mediators 
Evidence Code section 1121 provides that unless the parties agree 
otherwise, the court may not consider any “report, assessment, evaluation, 
recommendation or finding of any kind” by a mediator concerning a 
mediation, the only report a mediator may make is one that simply states 
whether an agreement was reached.111  The comments to section 1121 
explain that the rationale behind this statutory provision is aimed at making 
sure a mediator will “not be able to influence the result of a mediation or 
adjudication by reporting or threatening to report to the decision maker on 
the merits of the dispute or reasons why mediation failed to resolve it.”112  
The companion to section 1121 is Evidence Code section 703.5, which 
declares that a mediator shall be incompetent to testify as to any statement, 
conduct, decision, or ruling occurring in or in conjunction with a mediation 
that she conducted.113 
The broad prohibition against mediators making a report of any kind to 
the court—beyond the statement that a settlement was or was not reached—
does not prohibit a party from advising the court about conduct during the 
mediation that might warrant sanctions.114  In Foxgate, plaintiff attached a 
report by the mediator and a declaration by plaintiff’s counsel reciting 
statements made during the mediation session, which the Supreme Court of 
California found was prohibited by Evidence Code sections 1119 and 
 
 109. Robert K. Sall, Ethical Concerns Regarding Mediation Confidentiality and the 
Implications of Cassel, ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER, Apr. 2011, at 42-45; Diane Karpman, High 
Court Holds Lawyers are Not Accountable for Misconduct During Mediation , CALIFORNIA BAR 
JOURNAL (Feb. 2011),  
http://www.calbarjournal.com/February2011/Attorneydiscipline/EthicsByte.aspx.  
 110. In this regard, the supreme court noted that when the mediation confidentiality statutes 
apply, they are unqualified absent express statutory exception and must be applied “in strict 
accordance with their plain terms.”  Cassel, 244 P.3d at 1087. 
 111. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1121 (West 2011). 
 112. Id. § 1121 cmt. (1997). 
 113. Id. § 703.5. 
 114. Foxgate Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1128 (Cal. 2001). 
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1121.115  However, the supreme court noted that to the extent the declaration 
of plaintiff’s counsel stated that the mediator had ordered the parties to be 
present with their experts, there was no violation because “neither section 
1119 nor section 1121 prohibits a party from revealing or reporting to the 
court about noncommunicative conduct, including violation of the orders of 
a mediator or the court during the mediation.”116  In 2008, the California 
Court of Appeal for the Third District relied on Foxgate to find that the 
failure to have all persons or representatives attend court-ordered 
mediation—as required by local rules—was “conduct that a party, but not a 
mediator, may report to the court as a basis for monetary sanctions.”117  
Similarly, in 2010, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District 
upheld an order imposing sanctions for the unauthorized failure of a party to 
attend a court-ordered mediation.118 
D. Special Rules Related to Written Settlement Agreements Reached in 
Mediation 
While the ultimate goal in mediation is for the parties to reach 
agreement on terms to resolve their dispute, a written settlement agreement 
or term sheet memorandum prepared with respect to the settlement is a 
writing prepared during the course of mediation and, as such, is entitled to 
exclusionary protection under Evidence Code section 1119.119  Pursuant to 
section 1123, such writings shall not be inadmissible or protected from 
disclosure if any of the following conditions are satisfied: 
(a) The agreement provides that it is admissible or subject to disclosure, or words to that 
effect.120 
(b) The agreement provides that it is enforceable or binding or words to that effect.121 
(c) All parties to the agreement expressly agree in writing . . . to its disclosure.122 
(d) The agreement is used to show fraud, duress, or illegality that is relevant to an issue 
in dispute.123 
 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 1128 n.14. 
 117. Campagnone v. Enjoyable Pools & Spas Serv. & Repairs, Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 551, 555 
(Ct. App. 2008).  The court of appeal went on to note, however, that reporting on anything more than 
a party’s non-attendance might violate the confidentiality rules.  Id. 
 118. See Ellerbee v. County of L.A., 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 756, 763 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 119. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West 2011). 
 120. Id. § 1123(a). 
 121. Id. § 1123(b). 
 122. Id. § 1123(c). 
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In 2006, the Supreme Court of California had occasion to construe the 
application of Evidence Code section 1123 and interpreted it quite strictly 
and literally.124  In Fair, the parties to a civil dispute mediated their disputes 
over the course of a two-day period.125  At the end of the second day, 
plaintiff’s counsel drafted a handwritten memorandum which set forth the 
settlement terms the parties had agreed to, including an arbitration clause for 
any and all future disputes that might arise between the parties.126  
Postmediation, the parties exchanged formal settlement agreements, but 
were ultimately unable to reach agreement on the terms for a final written 
settlement agreement.127  Plaintiff then demanded arbitration under the 
arbitration clause included in the term sheet memorandum.128  Defendant 
rejected the demand and contended that the term sheet memorandum was 
inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1119(b) because it represented a 
writing prepared in the course of a mediation.129  Plaintiff then moved to 
compel arbitration pursuant to the term sheet memorandum.130  Defendant 
opposed the motion and objected to the admission of the term sheet 
memorandum and parts of plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration which referred to 
discussions at the mediation under Evidence Code section 1119.131  The trial 
court sustained defendant’s objection and excluded the term sheet and 
portions of plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration under section 1119 on the 
grounds that the declaration failed to meet the requirements of Evidence 
Code section 1123.132 
On appeal, the court of appeal reversed, holding that the inclusion of the 
provision providing for any and all disputes to be submitted to arbitration 
could only mean that the parties intended the term sheet to be enforceable 
and binding.133  On further appeal to the Supreme Court of California, the 
court reversed and held that the court of appeal had erred by concluding that 
the inclusion of an arbitration clause satisfied the requirements of Evidence 
Code section 1123(b).134  The supreme court noted that, although the 
legislature had not provided the courts with a “bright line” rule regarding 
 
 123. Id. § 1123(d). 
 124. See Fair v. Bakhtiari, 147 P.3d 653, 654 (Cal. 2006). 
 125. Id. at 655. 
 126. Id. at 654-55. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 194. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 197-98. 
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what would qualify as “words to that effect” as a substitute for an express 
statement that the agreement was intended to be enforceable and binding, “a 
narrow interpretation of this clause is required.”135 
The phrase “words to that effect” . . . refers to language that conveys a general meaning 
or import, in this instance the meanings of “enforceable or binding.”  Under section 
1123(b), the use of such language will exempt a written settlement agreement from the 
general rule that documents prepared during mediation are inadmissible in future 
proceedings.  The Legislature’s goal was to allow parties to express their intent to be 
bound in words they were likely to use, rather than requiring a legalistic formulation.  
The Legislature also meant to clarify the rules governing admissibility and reduce the 
likelihood that parties would overlook those rules.  To meet these objectives, we must 
balance the requirements of flexibility and clarity, without eroding the confidentiality that 
is “essential to effective mediation.”136 
The supreme court concluded that in order to fit within the exception to 
confidentiality provided by Evidence Code section 1123(b), a settlement 
agreement must include a statement that is intended to be “enforceable” or 
“binding.”137 
E. Special Rules Related to Oral Settlement Agreements Reached in 
Mediation 
California Evidence Code section 1123(c) provides that an oral 
settlement agreement may be admissible if it satisfies the requirements of 
section 1118.138  Pursuant to Evidence Code section 1118, an oral agreement 
made in accordance with section 1118 must satisfy all of the following 
conditions: 
(a) The oral agreement is recorded by a court reporter or reliable means of audio 
recording.139 
(b) The terms of the oral agreement are recited on the record in the presence of the 
parties and the mediator, and the parties express on the record that they agree to the terms 
so recited.140 
(c) The parties to the oral agreement expressly state on the record that the agreement is 
enforceable or binding . . . .141 
 
 135. Id. at 197. 
 136. Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Foxgate Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 
25 P.3d 1117, 1126 (Cal. 2001); Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 265 (Cal. 2004)). 
 137. Fair v. Bakhtiari, 147 P.3d 653, 660 (Cal. 2006). 
 138. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1123(c) (West 2011). 
 139. Id. § 1118(a). 
 140. Id. § 1118(b). 
 141. Id. § 1118(c). 
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(d) The recording is reduced to writing and the writing is signed by the parties within 72 
hours after it is recorded.142 
IV. THE NONPRIVILEGED AND UNDERPROTECTED STATUS OF MEDIATION 
CONFIDENTIALITY UNDER FEDERAL LAW 
A. Federal Rules of Evidence 408 
The starting place for understanding the federal perspective on 
mediation confidentiality is the common law rule that (a) the public is 
entitled to every person’s evidence, and (b) testimonial privileges are 
disfavored.143  There is no federal statute, rule of procedure, or rule of 
evidence that expressly recognizes or provides confidentiality protection for 
communications during or in connection with a mediation.  The only express 
protection for settlement discussions is provided by Rule 408 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, which makes “conduct or statements made in 
compromise negotiations regarding the claim” inadmissible to prove 
liability.144  Thus, Rule 408 provides an admission standard for proof offered 
at trial to prove liability or invalidity of a claim and speaks in terms of 
relevancy.  Its purpose is “to encourage the compromise and settlement of 
existing disputes”145 so as to avoid “the chilling effect” that potential 
disclosure might have on a party’s willingness to make a compromise offer 
for fear of jeopardizing its case or defense if the matter is not settled.146 
It is important to note that, by its terms, Rule 408(a) applies only to the 
admissibility of evidence at trial and does not apply to discovery of 
settlement negotiations or settlement terms.147  On this issue, the courts are 
split as to whether Rule 408 precludes discovery.148  Moreover, Rule 408(b) 
expressly provides that exclusion is not required if the “offer and 
compromise” evidence is offered for a purpose that is not expressly 
 
 142. Id. § 1118(d). 
 143. See Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 7 (1996). 
 144. FED. R. EVID. 408(b)(1)–(2). 
 145. Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1064 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 146. Molina v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-04796 MMM (FMx), 2008 WL 4447678, at 
*11-12 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008). 
 147. See FED. R. EVID. 408(a). 
 148. Compare Bottaro v. Hatton Assocs., 96 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (barring 
discovery of settlement terms), with Bennett v. La Pere, 112 F.R.D. 136, 139-40 (D.R.I. 1986) 
(allowing discovery of settlement discussions), and NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 612 F. Supp. 1143, 1146 (D.D.C. 1985) (allowing discovery if information is 
relevant to other issues in the pending action). 
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prohibited by Rule 408(a).149  Among the “permitted uses” delineated in 
Rule 408(b) are evidence of settlement and compromise negotiations offered 
(1) to prove bias or prejudice on the part of a witness; (2) to prove that an 
alleged wrong was committed during the negotiations (e.g., libel, assault, 
unfair labor practice, etc.); (3) to negate a claim of undue delay; or (4) to 
prove obstruction of a criminal investigation or prosecution.150  Additionally, 
a number of courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have concluded that Rule 
408 does not make settlement offers inadmissible in the removal context 
where such offers represent evidence of the amount in controversy for the 
purpose of establishing the date on which such information was first made 
available to the defendant and thus started the thirty-day time period for 
removing a state court action to federal court.151  Numerous district court 
decisions have used the settlement letter to establish the amount in 
controversy.152 
In sum, Rule 408 is keenly focused on offers of compromise and 
negotiations involved in making, accepting, or rejecting such offers.  As 
such, Rule 408 appears not to provide protection of any sort for 
prenegotiation communications or exchanges of information that parties 
might have with or through a mediator, even though the goal of those 
discussions is to open settlement dialogue.153 
 
 149. FED. R. EVID.  408(b). 
 150. Id.  
 151. See, Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a letter sent 
by plaintiffs estimating the amount alleged put defendant on notice of the amount in controversy); 
Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A settlement letter is relevant evidence of the 
amount in controversy if it appears to reflect a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff’s claim.”).  
 152. See Munoz v. J.C. Penny Corp., No. CV09-0833 ODW (JTLx), 2009 WL 975846 (C.D. 
Cal. Apr. 9, 2009) (settlement proposal letter was admissible to establish that the jurisdictional 
amount in controversy had been met for purposes of removing the case to federal court); see also 
Ray v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 08-5025, 2008 WL 3992644, *4 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 22, 2008) 
(settlement letter used to establish the amount in controversy); Haydel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., No. CIVA 07-939-C, 2008 WL 2781472, *8, n.8 (M.D. La. July 10, 2008); Finnegan v. 
Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-185, 2008 WL 2078068, *3 (S.D. Ohio May 13, 2008); Sulit v. 
Slep-Tone Entm’t, No. C06-00045 MJJ, 2007 WL 4169762, *3, n.1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2007); 
Turner v. Baker, No. 05-3298-CV-S-SWH, 2005 WL 3132325, *3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 22, 2005); 
LaPree v. Prudential Fin., 385 F. Supp. 2d 839, 849, n.9 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 17, 2005). 
 153. See FED. R. EVID. 408. 
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B. Federal Rules of Evidence 501 
The only other source of confidentiality protection in federal cases is 
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.154  Rule 501 empowers the 
holder of a recognized privilege to use the legal process to prevent others 
from disclosing protected communications.155  It also vests the holder with 
the right to refuse to produce otherwise relevant evidence.156  What qualifies 
as a “recognized privilege” is not detailed in Rule 501.157  In federal question 
cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the extent to which a privilege exists is 
governed by federal common law158 and may not be augmented by local 
court rules.159  In diversity cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, where state law 
provides the rule of decision, the existence of a privilege is a matter of 
applicable state law.160  To date, there are only two cases in the Central 
 
 154. See FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.  See also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367, n.10 (9th Cir. 1992).  
Rule 501 raises a difficult question regarding which law shall apply in federal question cases with 
pendent state law claims.  In the Ninth Circuit, that question has been resolved so that the law of 
privilege is governed by federal common law.  See id. at n.10 (court refused to apply California 
litigation privilege in copyright action with pendent state law claims); Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. 
Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1169-70 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (stating that the federal 
common law of privileges governs both federal and pendent state law claims in federal question 
cases); see also Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462, 467 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (the federal law 
of privilege is paramount in federal question cases even if the witness testimony is relevant to a 
pendent state law count which may be controlled by a contrary state law privilege); Hancock v. 
Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that the federal law of privilege is paramount 
to federal question cases). 
 159. See Facebook, Inc. v. Pac. Nw. Software, Inc., 640 F.3d 1034, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A 
local rule, like any court order, can impose a duty of confidentiality as to any aspect of litigation, 
including mediation. . . .  But privileges are created by federal common law.”)  In Facebook, the 
Winklevosses sought to avoid enforcement of the settlement agreement between ConnectU and 
Facebook which was negotiated and entered into during a private mediation.  Id. at 1040.  The 
Winklevosses proffered evidence of what was and was not said during the mediation.  Id.  The 
District Court for the Northern District of California excluded this evidence under its local rule that 
protected such communications as “confidential information,” which the court read as creating a 
“privilege” for “evidence regarding the details of the parties’ negotiations in their mediation.”  Id. at 
1040.  While the Ninth Circuit found that the district court’s reason for excluding the evidence was 
wrong, it concluded that the court was nevertheless correct in excluding the proffered evidence 
because the parties had engaged with a private mediator and had signed an express written 
confidentiality agreement before the mediation commenced.  Id. at 1041.  Accordingly, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the confidentiality agreement signed by the Winklevosses precluded them from 
introducing “any evidence of what Facebook said, or did not say, during the mediation.”  Id. 
 160. FED. R. EVID. 501.  See also Olam v. Cong. Mortg. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1124-25 
(N.D. Cal. 1999).  That being said, federal law governs whether a case exceeds the amount in 
controversy requirement.  See Molina v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-04796 MMM (FMx), 2008 
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District of California that have recognized a federal mediation privilege to 
protect communications made in conjunction with a formal mediation 
proceeding: the 1998 reported decision of District Judge Paez in Folb v. 
Motion Picture Industry Pension & Health Plans161 and the 2008 unreported 
decision of District Judge Morrow in Molina v. Lexmark International, 
Inc.162 
1. Folb Decision (1998) 
In Folb, a former employee complained that he had been terminated by 
his employer in retaliation for whistle-blowing.163  The employer responded 
that Folb was terminated because he had sexually harassed a fellow 
employee named Vasquez.164  The employer and Vasquez had previously 
participated in mediation in an attempt to settle Vasquez’s claims against the 
company arising from Folb’s alleged harassment.165  Folb then sought to 
compel production of the mediation briefs and “related correspondence 
regarding settlement negotiations” between his former employer and 
Vasquez.166  Folb argued that these documents would reveal that, during 
mediation, his former employer had taken the position that Folb had not 
harassed Vasquez.167  The court held that Folb was entitled to discovery 
regarding settlement negotiations conducted after mediation, but concluded 
that a federal common law mediation privilege protected the mediation 
briefs from discovery.168  The trial judge stated that the privilege applied 
only to “communications between parties who agreed in writing to 
participate in a confidential mediation with a neutral third party.”169  This 
 
WL 4447678, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008) (citing Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 
352 (1961)). 
 161. Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 
1998). 
 162. Molina v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-04796 MMM (FMx), 2008 WL 4447678 (C.D. 
Cal. Sept. 30, 2008). 
 163. Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1166. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 1167. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 1168. 
 168. Id. at 1167. 
 169. Id. at 1180.  As to any other details concerning the federal mediation privilege, the trial 
judge simply observed that “the contours of such a federal privilege [will have] to be fleshed out 
over time.”  Id. at 1179.  In this regard, the trial court stressed that its recognition of a federal 
mediation privilege was limited to the factual context, namely, a situation in which a third party who 
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left open the question of whether a “mediation” or “settlement proceeding” 
conducted as part of a federal court’s alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
program would qualify for protection without a written mediation and 
confidentiality agreement between the parties.170  While such a distinction 
would not be available under California law due to the broad interpretation 
as to what qualifies as a mediation for purposes of confidentiality,171 the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Facebook and the district court’s decisions in 
Molina and Folb suggest that the extent to which confidentiality protections 
are available in federal court matters may depend on (a) the label used to 
describe the parties’ facilitated settlement efforts, (b) who is seeking to 
disclose or compel disclosure, and (c) the purpose or use of the 
information.172 
2. Molina Decision (2008) 
In Molina, Ron Molina filed a class action against his former employer, 
Lexmark International, in state court in August 2005.173  In July 2008, two 
weeks before trial, Lexmark removed the case to federal court.174  Lexmark 
asserted that the court had jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act 
(CAFA)—specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)—which grants district courts 
original jurisdiction over any civil action in which the amount in controversy 
exceeds $5 million and any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a 
state different from any defendant.175  Lexmark claimed that it first became 
 
did not participate in the mediation was seeking discovery of mediation-related communications of 
the parties who did participate.  Id. at 1180. 
 
On the facts presented here, the Court concludes that communications to the mediator and 
communications between parties during the mediation are protected.  In addition, 
communications in preparation for and during the course of a mediation with a neutral 
must be protected.  Subsequent negotiations between the parties, however, are not 
protected even if they include information initially disclosed in the mediation. 
 
Id. 
 170. See id.   
 171. See supra Part III.A. 
 172. See supra note 160; discussion infra Part IV.B.2.  With regard to the label given to the 
facilitated settlement effort, there are several district court decisions where courts have denied 
confidentiality protection because the communications at issue did not occur in a “formal 
mediation.”  See, e.g., EEOC v. Albion River Inn, Inc., No. C 06-05356 SI, 2007 WL 2560718, *2 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2007); Cal. Serv. Emps. Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advance Bldg. Maint., 
No. C06-3078 CW (BZ), 2007 WL 2669823, *1 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 7, 2007).  
 173. Molina v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-04796 MMM (FMx), 2008 WL 4447678, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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aware that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million in July 2008 when 
it received a summary of damages prepared by Molina’s expert witness as 
part of the pretrial exchange.176  Molina filed a motion for remand, arguing 
that Lexmark’s removal application was untimely because Lexmark had 
been put on notice of the amount in controversy two years earlier when class 
counsel shared a damages analysis during a mediation.177 
The timing of removal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and provides 
that a defendant has thirty days to file a notice of removal once he learns that 
an action is removable.178  This thirty-day period begins to run from the 
defendant’s receipt of the initial pleading only when the pleading reveals, on 
its face, the facts necessary for federal court jurisdiction—in Molina it was 
the amount in controversy.179  However, when the amount in controversy is 
not clear on the face of the initial pleading, the thirty-day period for removal 
does not begin to run until the defendant receives a copy of an amended 
pleading, motion, order, or “other paper” from which it can be determined 
that the case is removable.180  The court in Molina duly noted that a 
document reflecting a settlement demand in excess of the jurisdictional 
minimum constitutes an “other paper” sufficient to provide notice that a case 
is removable.181 
The “other paper” at issue in Molina was a damages analysis prepared 
by Molina’s expert which was shared during the May 2006 mediation.182  
Lexmark denied receiving a copy of the damages analysis183 and argued that, 
even if it had, the federal common law mediation privilege articulated in 
Folb prohibited the use of information exchanged during mediation for any 
purpose.184  Alternatively, Lexmark argued that because federal court 
jurisdiction was based on diversity, California’s mediation confidentiality 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at *4.  
 179. See Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 690-91 (9th Cir. 1997) (Ninth 
Circuit joined “sister circuits” in their interpretation that 28 U.S.C. § 1446 begins to run from the 
defendant’s receipt of the initial pleading when the facts reveal federal jurisdiction is necessary).  
 180. See Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 181. Molina, 2008 WL 4447678, at *4 (citing Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 974-
75 (9th Cir. 2007) (settlement letter exchanged between counsel); Ambriz v. Luxury Imps. of 
Sacramento Inc., No. C 08-01004 JSW, 2008 WL 1994880, *2 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2008) (settlement 
demand letter); Krajca v. Southland Corp., 206 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1081-82 (D. Nev. 2002) 
(settlement letter)). 
 182. Molina, 2008 WL 4447678, at *17. 
 183. Id. at *2. 
 184. Id. at *6. 
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protections should apply—under California law, the information exchanged 
was clearly protected because it was developed for and used during the 
course of mediation.185  The court rejected this latter argument because a 
case that exceeds the amount in controversy requirement for federal court 
jurisdiction is governed by federal law and, as such, federal privilege law 
controls.186 
After going through a very thorough analysis of mediation 
confidentiality, the court in Molina also rejected Lexmark’s argument that 
the information exchanged during the May 2006 mediation was privileged as 
a matter of federal common law.187  Looking at the decision in Folb, the 
court noted that while the contours of the privilege recognized in that case 
were unclear,188 the holding was expressly limited to the factual context 
before the Folb court, namely, a situation in which a third party who did not 
participate in the mediation was seeking discovery of mediation-related 
communications for use in a different legal proceeding.189  In this context, 
the court in Molina found that the issue presented in Folb was whether a 
privilege shielded mediation discussions from discovery by third parties.190  
The situation presented in Molina involved communications during a 
mediation between disputants’ counsel regarding the amount in controversy 
and raised the issue of whether a duty of confidentiality existed between the 
parties that required them to keep their mediation discussions confidential.191  
The court reasoned that a duty of confidentiality was distinguishable and 
different from a privilege.192 
This distinction between evidentiary privilege and confidentiality helps 
clarify the issue in the present case.  Although “confidentiality” and 
“privilege” are often used interchangeably in discussions of mediation, the 
terms refer to two distinct concepts.  “Confidentiality” refers to a duty to 
keep information secret, while “privilege” refers to protection of information 
from compelled disclosure.  Communications are confidential when the 
freedom of the parties to disclose them voluntarily is limited; they are 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. (citing Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 352 (1961)).  See also 
LensCrafters, 498 F.3d at 974-75 (state privilege law did not apply in determining whether a 
settlement letter sent in preparation for mediation was privileged and therefore  not an “other 
paper”); Breed v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 F.2d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 1976) (when a question of federal 
law is at issue, state law as to privileges may provide a useful referent, but is not controlling). 
 187. Molina, 2008 WL 4447678, at *7. 
 188. Id. at *8 (“[T]he contours of such a federal privilege [will have] to be fleshed out over 
time.”). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id.  at *11. 
 191. Id. at *10-11 (internal citations omitted). 
 192. Id. 
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privileged when the ability of third parties to compel disclosure of them, or 
testimony regarding them, is limited.  Distinguishing between these concepts 
in the mediation context is sometimes difficult because the relationship 
between the parties to a mediation is different than the type of fiduciary 
relationship that typically gives rise to an evidentiary privilege or duty of 
confidentiality . . . .193 
The court in Molina determined that although Lexmark argued 
“mediation privilege,” it was really seeking to invoke a “duty of 
confidentiality” to prevent other parties to the mediation from disclosing 
mediation communications voluntarily.194  Because of the distinction 
between a privilege and a duty of confidentiality, the court reasoned that 
Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provided a better reference point 
for analyzing Lexmark’s confidentiality claim than did Folb.195  Similar to 
the general discussion contained in Section 4(A) of this Article, the Molina 
court ruled that Rule 408 does not make settlement offers inadmissible in the 
removal context for purposes of establishing evidence in the amount of 
controversy and, in this case, the date such information was first 
communicated to the defendant.196  In so ruling, the court noted that “parties 
to a mediation generally have a duty to keep their discussions confidential,” 
but concluded that this duty does not prevent use of mediation discussions 
for the limited purpose of establishing the amount in controversy for 
purposes of determining whether federal court jurisdiction properly exists.197 
[U]se of settlement offers as evidence of the amount in controversy has not hindered Rule 
408’s goal of encouraging open and honest discussion during negotiation.  This makes 
sense; concern that one’s adversary will use statements during negotiation as proof of 
liability or wrongdoing, not concern that it will use them as proof of the amount is 
controversy, is the primary obstacle to forthright negotiation discussions.198 
3. Ninth Circuit Decisions Which Have Avoided the Issue 
On at least three occasions, the Ninth Circuit has had the opportunity to 
say something definitive on whether a federal mediation privilege will be 
 
 193. Id. at *10 (citing Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go the 
Privileges, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 25-34 (2001)). 
 194. Molina, 2008 WL 4447678, at *11. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at *12.  
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at *13. 
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recognized in this circuit.199  However, in all cases, it has avoided the issue!  
In Dusek, a 2005 decision, the issue concerned the propriety of the 
magistrate judge’s orders quashing notices of depositions and subpoenas 
aimed at discovery regarding settlement negotiations in related class actions 
that were settled.200  The Ninth Circuit found that because the appealing 
party failed to make the requisite foundational showing that class counsel in 
the settled matters had an actual or potential conflict of interest, it “need not 
address whether the Ninth Circuit should recognize a federal mediation 
privilege and, if so, whether it applies here.”201 
In Lenscrafters, a 2007 decision, the issue was more squarely raised.202  
In this case, counsel for the plaintiff class sent a letter to counsel for the 
employer in preparation for an upcoming mediation.203  The mediation did 
not end in a settlement.204  The employer then removed the action to federal 
court and the plaintiff class filed a motion for remand to the state court.205  
The issue was whether the settlement letter was sufficient to put the 
employer on notice that the amount in controversy exceeded federal class 
action diversity jurisdiction requirements so as to support removal from state 
to federal court and start the thirty-day clock running with respect to the time 
in which the employer could file a notice of removal.206  In opposing the 
remand motion filed by the plaintiff class, the employer objected to the 
settlement letter as evidence of notice, arguing that it was privileged under 
Evidence Code section 1119.207  The Ninth Circuit found that the 
confidentiality protections provided under state law were not applicable 
because federal law governs the determination of whether a case exceeds the 
amount in controversy necessary for a diversity action to proceed in federal 
court.208  As such, federal privilege law applied.209  As to the existence of 
any federal mediation privilege, the Ninth Circuit found that because the 
employer had failed to raise that argument before the district court or in his 
appellate briefs, the employer waived his right to raise the issue.210 
 
 199. Facebook, Inc. v. Pac. Nw. Software, Inc., 640 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011); Babasa v. 
LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007); Dusek v. Mattel, Inc., 141 F. App’x 586 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
 200. Dusek, 141 F. App’x at 586. 
 201. Id. 
 202. LensCrafters, 498 F.3d at 973-74. 
 203. Id. at 974. 
 204. Id.  
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 974-75. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 975 n.1. 
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In Facebook, a 2011 decision, The Facebook, Inc. sought to enforce a 
settlement reached during a private mediation with ConnectU, an entity 
owned by the Winklevoss twins.211  The Winklevosses sought to avoid 
enforcement of the settlement agreement between ConnectU and Facebook 
on the grounds that Facebook had misled them about the value of its shares 
given during an exchange in which Facebook acquired all of ConnectU’s 
shares.212  In support of their action to rescind the settlement, the 
Winklevosses proffered evidence of what was said and not said during the 
mediation.213  The District Court for the Northern District of California 
excluded this evidence under its local rule that protected such 
communications as “confidential information,” which the court read as 
creating a “privilege” for “evidence regarding the details of the parties’ 
negotiations in their mediation.”214  While the Ninth Circuit found that the 
district court’s reason for excluding the evidence was wrong, it concluded 
that the court was nevertheless correct in excluding the proffered evidence 
because the parties had engaged a private mediator and had signed an 
express, written confidentiality agreement before the mediation 
commenced.215  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the confidentiality 
agreement signed by the Winklevosses precluded them from introducing 
“any evidence of what Facebook said or did not say during the 
mediation.”216  It is important to note that while the Ninth Circuit held that 
privileges are created by federal common law and cannot be augmented by 
local court rules, it also recognized that “[a] local rule, like any court order, 
can impose a duty of confidentiality as to any aspect of litigation, including 
mediation.”217 
Consequently, there is nothing in Rule 501 that recognizes a federal 
mediation privilege.218  In fact, there is nothing in Rule 501 that specifically 
recognizes any privilege.219  Privileges are matters for the federal courts to 
 
 211. Facebook, Inc. v. Pac. Nw. Software, Inc., 640 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1040.  
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 1041. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. (emphasis added). 
 218. FED. R. EVID. 501.  
 219. As discussed in Folb, Congress manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of 
privilege and to provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case 
basis and leave the door open for change.  Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 
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define based upon considerations of public policy and may change over 
time.220  Whether a privilege should exist is determined by asking whether 
the need for the privilege is clear and whether the contours of the privilege 
are evident so that it is appropriate for the courts to craft it in common law 
fashion.221  As the district court noted in Folb, in addition to the theoretical 
underpinnings of the mediation process and the long recognized policy of 
favoring and encouraging settlement, in assessing a proposed privilege, a 
federal court should examine whether a consistent body of state law exists 
when adopting or recognizing a privilege.222  With regard to mediation, the 
district court noted that “every state in the Union, with the exception of 
Delaware, has adopted a mediation privilege of one type or another.”223  
Thus, it would appear that a federal mediation privilege of some sort will 
eventually be recognized.224  However, as matters stand today, that 
protection does not exist.225 
4. Olam Decision (1999)226 
In 1999, one year after Judge Paez’s decision in Folb, Judge Brazil in 
the District Court for the Northern District of California rendered an 
important decision on mediation confidentiality that has added to the 
confusion in this area.227  In Olam, a borrower sued her lender for alleged 
violation of the Truth in Lending Act, in addition to asserting other federal 
and state law claims.228  A mediation was conducted as part of the court’s 
ADR program before a member of the court’s staff.229  A settlement was 
reached and the parties signed a memorandum of understanding which 
summarized the terms of settlement.230  Thereafter, the parties attempted to 
memorialize the agreement in the form of a formal settlement agreement and 
request for dismissal of the lawsuit.231  Those efforts failed.232  Defendant 
 
F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170-71 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 
(1980)). 
 220. Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1171.  
 221. In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1154 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 222. Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1178. 
 223. Id. at 1179. 
 224. Id. at 1179-80.  
 225. Id.  
 226. Olam v. Cong. Mortg. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
 227. Id. at 1110. 
 228. Id, at 1115. 
 229. Id. at 1116. 
 230. Id. at 1117. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
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then filed a motion seeking to enforce the original settlement as set forth in 
the memorandum of understanding and to enter judgment thereon.233 
Plaintiff opposed the motion on two grounds: first, that the 
memorandum of understanding was unconscionable and second, that she 
was subjected to undue influence and coercion in the manner in which the 
mediation was conducted.234  In support of this latter objection, plaintiff 
alleged that she was left alone in a room all day and into the early hours of 
the following day while all of the mediation participants conversed in a 
nearby room.235  She further claimed that: (1) she did not understand the 
mediation process; (2) she felt pressured to sign the memorandum of 
understanding; (3) her physical and emotional distress rendered her unduly 
susceptible to being pressured; and (4) she signed the memorandum of 
understanding against her will, without reading or understanding its terms.236 
Defendants raised the issue of mediation confidentiality, which 
prompted Judge Brazil to analyze whether that issue was to be decided as a 
matter of federal or state law.237  Judge Brazil concluded that California rule 
applied because the civil proceeding before the court was defendants’ 
motion to enforce the settlement agreement.238  In such a proceeding, the 
court reasoned, the only issue is whether an enforceable contract exists and 
such a substantive question must be decided by state law because there is no 
general federal law of contracts.239  While the court concluded that 
California law concerning mediation confidentiality governed whether, and 
to what extent, communications and conduct occurring during the mediation 
were protected from disclosure or subsequent evidentiary use, the court also 
held that it was not subject to a “procedural straight jacket” and was thus 
free to define its own procedure for applying California law so long as the 
court’s procedure caused “no greater harm to substantive privilege interests 
than California courts would be prepared to cause.”240 
Judge Brazil spent a considerable amount of time reviewing California’s 
mediation statutes, including the “mediator’s privilege” against giving 
testimony provided by Evidence Code section 703.5 and the broad mediation 
 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 1118. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 1119. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 1121. 
 240. Id. at 1126. 
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confidentiality protections provided by Evidence Code section 1119.241  
However, after this review, Judge Brazil concluded that the court could 
compel the mediator to testify because that was the most reliable evidence 
considering the conflicting testimonies of plaintiff and defendant.242  Judge 
Brazil also reasoned that, the fact that the parties and their attorneys signed a 
memorandum of understanding at the end of the mediation, California 
courts—and thus him—were permitted to consider, in the context of a 
hearing to determine enforceability, whether to admit evidence regarding 
what was said and done during the mediation itself.243  In determining 
whether, under California law, the district court should compel the mediator 
to testify despite the statutory prohibitions set forth in the aforementioned 
Evidence Code sections, Judge Brazil relied on the 1998 court of appeal 
decision in Rinaker v. Superior Court as standing for the broad proposition 
that a mediator can be required to submit to in camera examination by a 
judge and can be compelled to testify if, after in camera consideration of 
what the mediator’s testimony would be, the trial judge determines that the 
mediator’s testimony “might well promote significantly the public interest in 
preventing perjury and the defendant’s fundamental right to a fair judicial 
process.”244  While the trial court in Rinaker did require the mediator to 
testify, the factual context of that case was unique and some would argue 
that the holding was limited to those special factual circumstances.245 
In Rinaker, juveniles were charged with committing vandalism—a 
crime that could result in incarceration in a juvenile facility, and thus denial 
of liberty.246  The victim filed a civil harassment action and a mediation was 
conducted.247  During the mediation, the victim admitted that he had not 
actually seen who threw the rocks at his car.248  However, at trial in the 
criminal matter, the victim testified to the contrary during direct 
examination.249  The minors then sought to compel the mediator’s testimony 
 
 241. Id. at 1127-28. 
 242. Id. at 1127.  
 243. Id. at 1131.  Judge Brazil placed great significance on the written memorandum and stated 
that “[i]f there were no signed writing, and the alleged contract was oral, California law would not 
permit courts to use evidence from the mediation itself to determine whether an enforceable 
agreement had been reached.”  Id. 
 244. Id. (citing Rinaker v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 4th 155 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
 245. See Foxgate Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001) (“[T]he 
only California case upholding admission, over objection, of statements made during mediation in 
which no statutory exception to confidentiality applied, was Rinaker v. Superior Court . . . .”).  
 246. Rinaker, 62 Cal. App. 4th at 161-62. 
 247. Id. at 162. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 162, 169. 
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to impeach the victim’s testimony in the delinquency proceedings;250 
however, the trial court denied the motion.251  The court of appeal reversed, 
holding that the confidentiality provisions of Evidence Code section 1119 
must yield when necessary to ensure the minors’ constitutional right to 
effective cross examination and impeachment of an adverse witness in a 
juvenile delinquency proceeding.252  The court reasoned that neither the 
witness nor the mediator had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding 
inconsistent statements made during the mediation because it has long been 
established that, when balanced against the competing goals of preventing 
perjury and preserving the integrity of the truth-seeking process of a juvenile 
delinquency proceeding, the interest in promoting settlements must yield to 
the minors’ constitutional right to effective impeachment.253 
The Supreme Court of California precedent discussed above did not 
exist at the time Olam was decided.254  Such precedent clearly states that it is 
not for the courts to craft judicial exceptions to the broad confidentiality 
protections which have been provided by statute.255  Essentially, what Judge 
Brazil did was craft a judicial exception.256  One can only wonder if Judge 
Brazil would have decided this case differently in the face of the Foxgate, 
Rojas, Simmons and Cassel decisions if presented with the Olam facts today. 
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS REGARDING MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY 
There are several noteworthy “take aways” from the foregoing 
comparison of the confidentiality protections available to California litigants 
depending on whether they are in state or federal court.  First, the 
importance of confidentiality as a defining feature and essential ingredient of 
mediation seems to exist under both state and federal law.257  However, the 
scope of protection each system is willing to allow appears to represent the 
brightest line of demarcation between California’s state and federal courts.  
Both are oriented towards “fairness of process,” but have a different 
 
 250. Id. at 162. 
 251. Id. at 161. 
 252. Id. at 160-61. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Compare Cassel v. Superior Court, 244 P.3d 1080, 1090 (Cal. 2011), with Olam v. Cong. 
Mortg. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
 255. Cassel, 244 P.3d at 1088. 
 256. Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. 
 257. See supra Part III (discussing California’s strict confidentiality scheme); supra Part IV 
(discussing the nonprivileged status of mediation confidentiality under federal law). 
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emphasis. California courts focus on the process by making it clear what 
protection shall be afforded when disputants utilize mediation in an effort to 
resolve their differences.258  Additionally, California courts have made it 
clear that the scope of protection shall be broadly construed because the 
legislature chose to enact a statute detailing exceptions to confidentiality that 
are quite narrow.259  Through the Facebook and Molina decisions, the focus 
appears to be on the participants.260  Both cases suggest that federal courts 
could “tolerate” a duty of confidentiality between or among the participants 
in a mediation, provided there are exceptions which would allow the court to 
step in to redress any abuses (e.g. fraud, duress, coercion, or some other 
outcome that would constitute a miscarriage of justice).261 
A second “take away” is that while California’s confidentiality 
protections have been stated in the form of an evidence exclusion provision, 
California courts have construed this provision more like a privilege held by 
all participants which operates as a bar to compelling disclosure, discovery, 
or testimony without everyone’s consent.  While the Folb and Molina 
decisions acknowledged that confidentiality is an important and integral part 
of the mediation process, in neither case was the court willing to stake out a 
general rule for broad application.262  Instead, both decisions ultimately 
 
 258. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1115(c) (defining the processes that qualify for confidentiality 
protections). 
 259. Doe 1 v. Superior Court (Archdiocese Case), 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 248 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 260. See Molina v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-04796 MMM (FMx), 2008 WL 4447678 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008); Facebook, Inc. v. Pac. Nw. Software, Inc., 640 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 261. See Molina, 2008 WL 4447678; Facebook, 640 F.3d 1034.  The recently revised Local 
Rules of the United States District Court for the Central District of California provide an example of 
such qualified tolerance:   
 
[T]his Court, the mediator, all counsel and parties, and any other persons attending the 
mediation shall treat as “confidential information” the contents of the written mediation 
statements, any documents prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to 
the mediation, anything that happened or was said relating to the subject matter of the 
case in mediation, any position taken, and any view of the merits of the case expressed by 
any participant in connection with any mediation.  “Confidential information” shall not 
be: (1) disclosed to anyone not involved in the litigation; [or] (2) disclosed to the 
assigned judges . . . .   
 
C.D. Cal. R. 16-15.8(a).  But see C.D. Cal. R. 16-15.9 (allowing any judge or magistrate to dispense 
with the foregoing confidentiality protections “as the judge, in his or her discretion, determines to be 
appropriate”). 
 262. See Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, (C.D. Cal. 
1998); Molina, 2008 WL 4447678, at *16.  See also discussion supra Parts IV.B.1–2.  
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concluded that whether, when, and to what degree confidentiality protection 
is available will depend on the facts of the case.263 
A third “take away” is that Facebook presented the Ninth Circuit with 
an opportunity to recognize a “duty of confidentiality” based upon the 
northern district’s local rule.  The Ninth Circuit did not need to mention the 
local rule because the mediation at issue was not conducted through the 
court’s ADR program. However, since the court did mention the rule, it 
could have affirmed the lower court’s exclusion of evidence based upon a 
finding of a duty of confidentiality since the underlying dispute was the 
subject of litigation venued in the northern district.264  Recognizing such a 
duty of confidentiality based upon the court’s policies and treatment per its 
local rules may have only been dicta in the context of the case before the 
court, but it nevertheless would have advanced the ball in terms of 
validating—at the federal level—the notion that some level of 
confidentiality protection should be afforded communications during a 
mediation, especially for mediations conducted through the federal court’s 
ADR program.265 
A fourth “take away” from the Facebook decision is that parties to a 
mediation pending in federal court, or related to an existing or future federal 
court action, should execute a written confidentiality agreement covering 
anything the mediation participants might say or do during the course or in 
furtherance of the mediation.  This makes sense considering the Ninth 
Circuit precluded the Winklevosses from introducing “any evidence of what 
Facebook said, or did not say, during the mediation” because they had 
signed a confidentiality agreement with respect to the mediation.266  Such 
agreements, however, are only contracts and therefore bind only those 
persons who are parties to the agreement.  This means third-party litigants 
 
 263. See Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164; Molina, 2008 WL 447678, at *14.  See also discussion 
supra Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2. 
 264. See Facebook, 640 F.3d at 1036. 
 265. Under the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-52, all federal 
courts are required to provide civil litigants with at least one ADR process, including but not limited 
to mediation.  28 U.S.C. § 652(a).  In connection with these programs, the district courts must adopt 
local rules that provide for the confidentiality of the ADR process and “prohibit disclosure of 
confidential dispute resolution communications.”  28 U.S.C. § 652(d).  As such, the Ninth Circuit 
would not have been stepping out on much of a limb by validating the confidentiality protections 
provided under the northern district’s local rule.  See 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (requiring that district 
courts must adopt local rules that prohibit disclosure of confidential dispute resolution 
communications). 
 266. Facebook, 640 F.3d at 1040. 
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are not bound and can nevertheless seek to compel disclosure by the 
mediation participants by service of a subpoena. 
A final “take away” is that confidentiality is an essential and integral 
part of mediation.  It encourages the exchange of information between the 
parties and promotes problem-solving and interest-based negotiations, which 
can yield more durable settlements.  Doubts about the existence or scope of 
confidentiality protections cannot help but lead to less sharing, less 
willingness to develop information for use in mediation, less work in joint 
sessions, more work in private caucuses, and more indirect communications 
through the mediator so as to preserve deniability.  As this area of the law 
continues to develop, it will require a balancing of interests between 
mediation participants, courts charged with overseeing these disputes, third-
party litigants, and the public. 
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